BOARD COMPOSITION AND THE COMMISSION OF ILLEGAL ACTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES by Kesner, Idalene F. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Management Department Faculty Publications Management Department
1986
BOARD COMPOSITION AND THE
COMMISSION OF ILLEGAL ACTS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF FORTUNE 500
COMPANIES
Idalene F. Kesner
University of North Carolina
Bart Victor
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Bruce T. Lamont
Texas A & M University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Management Department Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Kesner, Idalene F.; Victor, Bart; and Lamont, Bruce T., "BOARD COMPOSITION AND THE COMMISSION OF ILLEGAL
ACTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES" (1986). Management Department Faculty Publications. 195.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/195
 RESEARCH NOTES
 ? Academy of Management Journal
 1986, Vol. 29, No. 4, 789-799.
 BOARD COMPOSITION AND THE COMMISSION
 OF ILLEGAL ACTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF
 FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES
 IDALENE F. KESNER
 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 BART VICTOR
 University of Nebraska
 BRUCE T. LAMONT
 Texas A & M University
 Corporate boardroom processes and board composition have long been
 topics of interest and debate for both organizational researchers and practi-
 tioners. In recent years, however, criticism of corporate boards has increased
 dramatically, as evidenced by the comments of former International Tele-
 phone & Telegraph chairman, Harold Geneen. According to Geneen, "the
 boards of directors of U.S. industry include numerous first-rate people doing
 what amounts to a second-rate job" (1984: 258). In defense of his position, he
 brought up many points, but board composition is the most central to his
 argument. Essentially, Geneen and other critics have argued that the designs
 of corporate boards restrict their members' independence and render them
 ineffective when it comes to monitoring top management and protecting
 stockholders' interests (Anshen, 1980; Drucker, 1973; Mace, 1971; Mintzberg,
 1983).
 The reform that critics of boardroom processes most frequently offer
 involves increased representation by outsiders, directors who are not mem-
 bers of management. According to these advocates, a higher proportion of
 outside members strengthens a board's independence and broadens its base
 of power and knowledge. What is perplexing, however, is that although
 accepted as common knowledge and adopted in the rules and regulations of
 various stock exchanges and government agencies, this position remains
 virtually untested. Thus, despite a clear trend in U.S. firms toward greater
 outside representation (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 1979, 1980: Herman, 1981;
 Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corporate Directors,
 1982; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980; Smith, 1978; Vance, 1983),
 we still do not know if organizations with greater proportions of outsiders
 on their boards are more effective in terms of serving stockholders than those
 companies dominated by insiders.
 This study was funded in part by a grant from the Business Foundation of North Carolina,
 Inc.
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 OUTSIDER DOMINANCE PERSPECTIVE
 The name frequently given to this strategy for boardroom reform is the
 outsider dominance perspective. According to supporters of this position,
 outsiders should be in the majority on corporate boards, because they offer
 greater breadth of knowledge and experience (Bacon & Brown, 1973;
 Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980;
 Williams & Shapiro, 1979). More important, advocates of this position con-
 sider outsiders a vital board resource because of two issues-independence,
 and the dual roles of many chief executive officers (CEOs) (Berg & Smith,
 1978).
 In over 75 percent of large U.S. firms, the CEO serves simultaneously as
 board chairman (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc. 1981; Korn/Ferry International,
 1981; National Association of Corporate Directors, 1982). Yet, despite its
 prevalence, this arrangement has met with severe criticism for two reasons.
 First, it represents a conflict of interests. According to Geneen, "the board's
 responsibility is to sit in judgment on the management, especially on the
 performance of the chief executive, and to reward, punish, or replace the
 management as the board ... sees fit" (1984: 252). The chief executive, on
 the other hand, is a professional manager. Geneen's point is that chairmen/
 CEOs cannot represent the shareholders in the first role and at the same time
 impartially sit in judgment on their own performance in the second role.
 In agreement with Geneen is former Securities and Exchange Commission
 (SEC) chairman, Harold Williams. According to Williams, the chairman and
 CEO perform two very different roles. It is a CEO's job to speak on behalf of
 management, but it is a chairman's job to question management (Williams &
 Shapiro, 1979). Palmieri (1979) also agreed, noting that a board chairman
 should strive to create an environment where questioning and in-depth dis-
 cussion are valued. A CEO, however, despite appreciating the board's
 function, wants to "get the meeting finished so the organization can get on
 with its business" (1979: 48).
 A second problem brought on by unitary leadership is that it forces
 inside or management directors into an uncomfortable position. As noted, it
 is a board's responsibility to monitor management's performance. Conse-
 quently, insiders are being asked to evaluate the individual who on a day-to-
 day basis acts as their boss. Supporters of outsider dominance suggest that
 outside directors, because of their independence, can better serve the inter-
 ests of stockholders. Unlike their inside counterparts, who are a CEO/chair-
 man's subordinates, outsiders can freely evaluate management's performance
 and act to remedy inappropriate or unacceptable situations.
 Strongly backed by advocates of boardroom reform, the notion of out-
 sider dominance has received support from other sources as well. Beginning
 in the late 1960s, for example, both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
 and American Stock Exchange (ASE) ruled that all firms listed on the
 exchanges must have a minimum of two outside board members (Securities
 and Exchange Commission, 1980).
 December 790
 Kesner, Victor, and Lamont
 Also during this time, Williams, then chairman of the SEC, actively
 promoted a more stringent proposal, suggesting that outsiders and CEOs be
 the sole members of boards (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Securities and
 Exchange Commission, 1980; Vance, 1983). Recently, there has been renewed
 interest in this proposal (Anshen, 1980; Geneen, 1984). Although never
 adopted as a rule by the SEC, Williams's idea did seem to have a profound
 effect on the composition of boards. A dramatic shift took place between
 1970 and 1980 (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1979, 1980; Herman, 1981;
 Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corporate Directors,
 1982; Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980; Smith, 1978; Vance, 1983).
 One report that surveyed 1,300 large firms found an increase in the percent-
 age of outsider representation from 59.6 percent in 1971 to 65.9 percent in
 1979, and in a 1981 update of the study, the percentage climbed to an even
 higher 72.2 percent (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1979, 1981). In still another
 study examining 887 firms, 71 percent of the directors were outsiders
 (National Association of Corporate Directors, 1982).
 In recent years, efforts to bolster the position of outsiders on corporate
 boards have continued. The stock exchanges and the SEC have adopted a
 number of new rules and regulations regarding board committees. For
 example, the SEC, NYSE, ASE, and National Association of Securities Deal-
 ers all advocate that outsiders should represent a significant portion of the
 membership of audit committees. In fact, the NYSE, which has the most
 stringent regulations of these groups, insists that all firms listed on the
 exchange must maintain an audit committee "comprised solely of directors
 independent of management and free from any relationship that... would
 interfere with the exercise of independent judgment" (National Association
 of Corporate Directors, 1982: 46).
 The SEC appears to agree with the NYSE's position, noting that having
 an audit committee whose members have vested interests related to those of
 management may be worse than having no audit committee at all, because a
 firm thus creates the appearance of having an effective body, but it in fact
 lacks substance (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1980). According to
 these regulators, the sensitive nature of such a committee's monitoring tasks
 makes it unlikely that insiders can maintain the needed independence. The
 duties and responsibilities of other groups, such as compensation and nomi-
 nating committees, also illustrate why many boards strive for, if not require,
 outside dominance on key committees.
 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
 Although the outsider dominance perspective has been popular since
 the 1960s, and the subject of numerous rules and regulations, there has been
 surprisingly little empirical research on the topic. Of the few studies that
 have been conducted, virtually all have used the performance of firms as
 their dependent variable (Schmidt, 1975; Smith, 1978; Vance, 1955, 1964).
 Moreover, their findings have been mixed. In fact, in many of the studies,
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 high proportions of insiders, not outsiders, are associated with high levels of
 performance (e.g., Vance, 1955, 1965), and thus their conclusions oppose the
 outsider dominance perspective and prevailing business sentiment.
 Although these findings may appear perplexing to some advocates of
 outsider dominance, others might question if these empirical studies have in
 fact captured the true question. After all, critics and supporters alike acknowl-
 edge that a board's role is to monitor and evaluate a firm and its top
 management. If directors affect the operations and performance of a company,
 it is only indirectly, through such acts as the hiring or firing of CEOs. Most
 advocates of boardroom reform readily acknowledge that it is not a board's
 responsibility to serve in an operating or functional capacity (Herman, 1981;
 Vance, 1983).
 Issues of legality appear to be an area over which boards have more di-
 rect control and interest (Mueller, 1979). Thus, an important test of the out-
 sider dominance perspective might be to examine the relationship between
 board composition and a firm's involvement in illegal activities. Since
 boards of directors are legally responsible (Committee on Corporate Laws,
 1976), its members may be more likely to monitor their firm's actions to
 insure that management is not acting illegally than they are to monitor func-
 tional operations in general. Although directors might not know about a
 firm's involvement in illegal actions, ignorance of such matters places them
 in a very precarious, and possibly severely damaging, legal position.
 This research question, which is substantially different from previous
 tests of the outsider dominance perspective, may help to clarify earlier
 findings. Rather than suggesting that outsiders strengthen firms through posi-
 tive effects on certain outcome or dependent variables like overall perfor-
 mance, this study considers whether outsiders strengthen firms by prevent-
 ing certain negative actions, specifically, illegal activities.
 Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relationship between
 the proportion of outsiders on its board and the number of
 illegal acts committed by a firm.
 This first hypothesis suggests that although both insiders and outsiders
 might be aware of a firm's involvement, or planned involvement, in illegal
 actions, insiders, because of their subordinate position, are less likely to
 speak up against management and a CEO/chairman despite sharing legal
 accountability. Outsiders, who do not work daily under the CEO, may be
 more likely to bring such actions to the attention of other board members and
 to object to the firm's planned or actual involvement.
 Although Hypothesis 1 addresses the direct relationship between the
 proportion of outsiders and a firm's involvement in illegal actions, it does
 not consider a simple majority effect. The key issue may not be the number
 or percentage of outsiders, but whether outside directors represent a minor-
 ity or a majority. In the first case, the outsiders may choose to remain silent,
 not voicing concerns over the legality of certain actions or questioning the
 CEO; in the second, they might be more willing to speak up.
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 Hypothesis 2: Firms with a majority of outsiders on their
 boards will engage in fewer illegal acts than those firms
 with a majority of insiders on their boards.
 These two hypotheses address the basic relationship between board struc-
 ture and illegal acts, but neither considers the possibility of a causal lag,
 whereby earlier illegal acts have lead to changes in board structure. After a
 firm's involvement in illegal acts, its board as a whole may seek to strengthen
 outside representation in an effort to improve its monitoring function and
 enhance stockholders' confidence. Altering a group's composition is a means
 to reassure various regulatory agencies and key constituents that a board
 intends to make changes so that this type of involvement will no longer be
 tolerated. Even if no actual modifications of the roles, responsibilities, and
 conduct of board members occur, a change in composition can serve as a
 symbolic action, signaling that the board will no longer condone such
 activities; in some respects such a change resembles the ritual scapegoat-
 ing often described in the literature on executive succession (Brown, 1982;
 Eitzen & Yetman, 1972; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Lieberson & O'Connor,
 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This notion that board composition and
 corporate illegal activities may be causally linked suggests that:
 Hypothesis 3: The greater a firm's involvement in illegal
 activities, the more likely it is to increase the proportion
 of outside directors on its board.
 Finally, given earlier arguments concerning the conflict of interests that
 might result when CEOs simultaneously serve as board chairmen, we suggest:
 Hypothesis 4: Firms with a single individual serving in
 the roles of CEO and chairman are more likely to commit
 illegal acts than firms with two separate individuals serv-
 ing in these roles.
 RESEARCH DESIGN
 The objective of this research was to test the relationship between board
 composition and the occurrence of illegal corporate acts. The population we
 used included all companies continuously listed on the Fortune 500 between
 the years 1980 and 1984 (N= 384). Most firms that were dropped from that list
 during this period were objects of corporate mergers and acquisitions. Staw
 and Szwajkowski (1975) provided information about types of illegal activities
 committed by these firms and Trade Cases (Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,
 1980-84) provided information concerning involvement in legally question-
 able activities. This publication reports decisions and consent and litigation
 decrees entered in federal and state courts for cases involving possible viola-
 tions of antitrust laws and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
 As did Staw and Szwajkowski (1975), we considered these areas of
 litigation: price discrimination, tying arrangements, refusal to deal, exclu-
 sive dealing, franchise violation, price fixing, foreclosure of entry, reciprocity,
 allocation of markets, monopoly, conspiracy, and illegal mergers and
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 acquisitions. We also used the same criteria, with the dependent variable
 represented by the total number of instances in which firms were found
 guilty in litigated cases, were parties to nonlitigated consent decrees, or
 involved in unsettled cases in which the court found substantial merit to the
 charges against the cited firms.
 Our classification of board members as insiders or outsiders also fol-
 lowed previous research (Pfeffer, 1972; Schmidt, 1975; Vance, 1964). We
 considered current or retired managers of an organization or of one of its
 subsidiaries to be inside directors. Outside directors did not currently hold,
 nor had they previously held, management positions within the company for
 which they were serving as director. Consulting Standard & Poor's Register of
 Corporations (1981-85), which lists directors either as members of manage-
 ment or outsiders, we divided the numbers of outside members by the total
 numbers of directors to obtain a proportion for each firm. However, because
 these data are longitudinal, and slight changes in board composition are
 common from year to year, it was necessary to average percentages of outsid-
 ers from 1980 to 1984.1 Thus, the proportion of outsiders represents the
 average proportion for each firm during the five years under investigation.
 For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable is binary, so we used a dummy
 variable, with firms having a majority (> 50%) of outsiders on their boards
 coded 1, and firms where outsiders were a minority coded 0 (Schmidt,
 1975).
 Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we needed to distinguish firms with a
 single individual serving as both CEO and chairman from those firms in
 which separate individuals held these positions. Once again, the relevant
 information was in Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations (1981-85).
 We compared names and titles to determine whether there was dual or
 separate leadership between 1980 and 1984. As might be expected, changes
 took place over time, with firms going from separate to dual leadership, or
 vice versa. Thus, in an effort to remain as conservative as possible, we used
 for further analysis only those firms that consistently maintained either dual
 or separate status throughout the relevant dates (N = 274).
 RESULTS
 For the companies in our population, the average number of directors
 between 1980 and 1984 ranged from a high of 40 to a low of 5 (x = 13). The
 proportion of outsiders to total directors ranged from a high of 100 to a low of
 12 percent, with the mean at 70 percent. The last figure is similar to earlier
 estimates regarding percentages of outsiders (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1981;
 Korn/Ferry International, 1981; National Association of Corporate Directors,
 1982). The numbers of illegal acts over the period ranged from a high of 17
 to a low of 0. Although the mean for all firms was less than 1 (0.90), the
 mean for those firms that were involved in some type of illegal activity was
 3. The numbers of firms with consistent dual and separate leadership
 1 We divided the proportion for each year by the number of years.
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 throughout the period were 245 and 29, respectively. Thus, for those firms
 that maintained a consistent leadership status, 89 percent had single indi-
 viduals serving in the roles of CEO and chairman, a figure consistent with
 earlier findings (Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 1981; National Association of
 Corporate Directors, 1982).
 Results offered no support for Hypothesis 1. The proportion of outsiders
 was not significantly related to the number of illegal acts (r = -.012, n.s.).
 Similarly, the results of a one-way analysis of variance indicated no signifi-
 cant relationship consistent with Hypothesis 2 (F = .07, n.s.). Firms with a
 majority of outsiders were not involved in fewer illegal acts than those
 represented by a majority of insiders.
 After these initial analyses, we considered two additional variables,
 organizational size and governmental regulation, either of which could have
 a substantial effect on the relationship under investigation. For example,
 some industries, such as defense, broadcasting, and oil and gas, are subject
 to greater regulation than others; this may, in turn, influence the number of
 illegal acts in which they are involved. We use partial correlation to control
 for size, measured in terms of firms' assets, and governmental regulation of
 industries defined as high or low, depending on the number of federal agen-
 cies monitoring the activities of the industry. Despite this additional control,
 the overall results remained the same (r = -.010, n.s.).
 Although no significant relationship was found when illegal acts were
 assessed in the aggregate over time, it is possible, as Hypothesis 3 suggests,
 that previous commission of illegal acts may have lead to changes in the
 structures of boards. In particular, the boards of firms that have been exposed
 to prosecution for illegal acts may recruit more outsiders to improve monitor-
 ing and enhance stockholders' confidence. To test this causal lag, we divided
 the years under examination into two equal periods-1980 to the second
 quarter of 1982, and the third quarter of 1982 to 1984--and calculated both
 the numbers of illegal acts and the percentages of outsiders on boards of
 directors for each subperiod. We then modeled the possible causal determi-
 nants of board structure as a series of regression equations.
 TABLE 1
 Correlations Between Proportion of Outside Directors
 and Number of Illegal Actsa
 Proportion of Majority of Number of
 Outside Directors Outside Directors Illegal Acts
 Proportion of outside directors - .650*** -.012
 Majority of outside directors .013
 a N=384
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 *** p < .001
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 Figure 1 displays the results of these analyses, and Table 2 presents the
 detailed results of the regression equations. The findings indicate that both
 board structure and the commission of illegal acts were consistent over time.
 No support emerged for the proposition that commission of illegal acts leads
 to changes in the structures of boards, either directly or indirectly. Similarly,
 there is no evidence that board structure directly or indirectly leads to the
 commission of illegal acts.
 Finally, one-way analysis of variance was used to test Hypothesis 4. The
 results indicate that firms where one individual serves as both CEO and
 chairman are no more likely to be associated with illegal acts than those
 firms in which separate individuals hold these positions (F = 1.82, n.s.).
 DISCUSSION
 The results of this investigation are important for several reasons. First,
 this work adds to the existing research, much of which has failed to support
 the outsider dominance perspective (Schmidt, 1975; Vance, 1955, 1964).
 The findings of this study do not suggest that adding outsiders to corporate
 boards will lessen a firm's involvement in illegal activities. Similarly, there is
 no evidence that firms dominated by outsiders are more likely to engage in
 illegal acts. In addition, this study represents a novel test of the outsider
 FIGURE 1
 Board Composition and Illegal Acts,
 Cross-Lagged Panel Analysisa
 Percentage .71 * * Percentage
 of outsiders of outsiders
 1980 1984
 -.008 .042 -.05
 Illegal acts Illegal acts
 1980-82 .25** 1982-84
 aIllegal acts 1980-82 refers to the number of illegal acts between the first quarter of 1980 and
 the second quarter of 1982. Illegal acts 1982-84 refers to the number of illegal acts between the
 third quarter of 1982 and the fourth quarter of 1984. Values on paths are standardized coeffi-
 cients (,'s).
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
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 TABLE 2
 Results of Regression Analysis
 of Determinants of Illegal Acts and Board Composition
 Percentage of Numbers of Illegal Acts Percentage of
 Outsiders, 1984 1980 1984
 Independent Variables t t , t
 Percentages of outsiders
 1980 .680 19.80** -.006 -.16 .13 .21
 1984 -.49 -.75
 Numbers of illegal acts
 1980 .003 .97 .19 5.10**
 1984 .003 -.75
 R2 .51 .0001 .06
 F 131.18 .03 8.67
 * p < .05
 ** p < .01
 dominance perspective. Previous examinations of this issue have focused on
 the relationship between board composition and performance, addressing
 the question of whether outsiders have a positive effect on firms by strength-
 ening positive outcomes. This study, however, approached the issue from a
 different perspective, asking if outsiders help to minimize or prevent cer-
 tain negative outcomes. Taken together, the results of these two types of
 studies lead us to question whether the objectives of outsider dominance, or
 conceptual arguments for this strategy, are legitimate. The evidence to date
 does not seem to support the belief that stockholders are better served by
 boards dominated by outsiders.
 For the most part, the outsider dominance perspective has remained
 unchallenged since its conception over 20 years ago. Moreover, given the
 recent and rather dramatic increase in criticism of corporate boards, it has
 been the basis of a highly recommended strategy for improving poor
 boardroom processes and enhancing stockholder representation. This study,
 however, raises questions as to whether this method of reform reaches desired
 ends.
 In the future, researchers may want to investigate what types of boardroom
 reforms will improve corporate performance and reduce firms' involve-
 ment in illegal activities. These reforms might include placing greater atten-
 tion on such background characteristics of directors as their experience and
 education, or focusing on their financial involvement in a company, such as
 stock ownership. Still other research efforts might examine the roles of board
 committees in efforts to improve the monitoring function of directors and
 reduce involvement in illegal actions. In sum, despite the popularity of the
 idea of outsider dominance and its adoption as the basis of certain rules and
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 regulations of various government agencies and stock exchanges like the
 SEC, NYSE, and ASE, the findings of this and prior studies suggest that we
 should reexamine this approach to boardroom reform.
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